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The Forgott en Victims: Ethnic Minorities in 
the Nigeria-Biafra War, 1967-1970
Arua Oko Omaka 
McMaster University, Canada
Abstract: The Nigeria-Biafra War att racted enormous international 
att ention not just for the brutal events of the period, but also because of 
how the confl ict was interpreted, especially by foreigners. The ghastly 
images of victims of the war dominated the international media and 
roused the world’s conscience. The confl ict took a toll on human 
lives on both the Igbo and the ethnic minorities in Biafra. While the 
Igbo tragedy was largely perpetrated in Northern Nigeria, that of the 
Biafran minorities – Efi k, Ijaw, Ogoja, Ibibio – occurred mainly in their 
homelands. The gory experiences suff ered by the Biafran minorities 
have largely been neglected in the historiography of the Biafra War. 
This paper examines the experiences of the ethnic minorities in Biafra 
during the war between July 1967 and January 1970. It argues that the 
minorities suff ered a high degree of persecution, molestation, injustice, 
psychological torture and other forms of suff ering which have not been 
fully examined in existing literature. The war subjected them to layers 
of loyalty and disloyalty both to the federal authority and the Biafran 
government. The paper asserts that these minority groups in Biafra 
were as much victims of the war as the Igbo. Hence, they should be 
accorded due recognition in the historiography of victimhood in the 
Nigeria-Biafra War.
Keywords: Biafra; Ethnic; Igbo; Massacre; Minorities; Nigeria; Victims; 
War. 
Introduction
The idea of “minority” is a concept that has posed some defi nitional problems 
among scholars. Owing to the fl uidity of the concept, there has not been any 
internationally accepted defi nition. The earliest att empt to provide a defi nition for 
the term was made in 1977 by Francesco Capotorti, the former Special Rapporteur 
of the United Nations, who defi ned minority as:
A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in 
a non-dominant position, whose members – being nationals of the State 
– possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics diff ering from 
those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense 
of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, 
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religion or language.1 
The problem with this defi nition is that it only covers persons belonging to ethnic, 
religious, or linguistic minorities. There is no provision for other minority groups 
in terms of diff erent social categories grounded in sexuality, gender, age, class, 
race, etc.
Article 1 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons 
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities adopted in 
1992 recognizes minorities as a group of people with similar national or ethnic, 
cultural, religious, and linguistic identity, and provides that states should protect 
their existence.2 The article makes reference to the same groups already identifi ed 
by Capotorti. But other groups such as sexual minorities, gender minorities, age 
minorities, and other minorities who also need rights, are omitt ed and consequently 
appear voiceless and unprotected. With the rapidity of socio-cultural, political, 
and economic changes taking place all over the world, the concept of minority 
continues to pose more questions than can easily be answered. A more workable 
defi nition of minority should thus be seen in terms of context. Based on this, I 
defi ne minority quite broadly as any group of people that is disadvantaged when 
compared to the rest of the population. The “minoritization” of a group should 
therefore be seen in terms of the situation and not just numerical weakness. For 
instance, a group can be a majority in terms of numerical strength but a minority in 
terms of political representation. In this situation, the group sees itself as a political 
minority and agitates for equality and justice. The minorities referred to in this 
paper are the ethnic minorities in Nigeria, and they are minorities because of both 
their numerical weakness and poor representation in the national politics. 
The Igbo Victims
The Nigeria-Biafra War started on July 6, 1967 and ended on January 15, 1970. 
The former Eastern Region of Nigeria seceded from Nigeria and declared its 
independence on May 30, 1967, following the massacre of the Igbo people who 
were living in the northern parts of Nigeria. The federal government of Nigeria 
responded to the secession with “police action,” that is, a partial military operation 
designed to crush what it perceived as a rebellion. These actions were the beginning 
of a war that lasted about thirty months. But what was originally interpreted as a 
1  Francesco Capotorti quoted in Offi  ce of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (OHCHR), “Minority Rights: International Standards and Guidance 
for Implementation” HR/PUB/10/3, accessed August 5, 2012, htt p://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/Publications/MinorityRights_en.pdf, 2.
2  OHCHR, “Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious 
and Linguistic Minorities Adopted by the General Assembly Resolution 47/135 of December 
18, 1992,” accessed February 28, 2013, htt p://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/
MinorityRights en.pdf. 
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domestic confl ict later took on an international dimension as state and non-state 
actors like Britain, the USSR, France, the Red Cross, and the World Council of 
Churches became involved in the confl ict. The war received one of the highest 
humanitarian interventions in recent history. The massive number of children and 
women facing starvation att racted the att ention of groups like the World Council 
of Churches, the International Committ ee of the Red Cross, Caritas Internationalis, 
Interreligious Aff airs for the American Jewish Committ ee, and UNICEF.3 The 
relief eff ort resulted in unusual Jewish-Christian co-operation.4 Countries like 
the United States, Germany, France, and the Nordic Countries made enormous 
contributions towards the relief eff ort.5 The international media also highlighted 
the humanitarian crisis in the war-torn region and successfully brought this part 
of the world into global focus. The New York Times, The London Times, La Stampa of 
Italy, and Le Monde of France were some of the newspapers that eff ectively covered 
the war.  
The dominant argument in the historiography of the Nigeria-Biafra War, 
both within academia and the popular media, is that the Igbo were targeted 
for extermination by the Muslim north. A year before the war, during the 1966 
massacres of Easterners in Northern Nigeria, the alleged indiscriminate bombing 
of civilian targets and the widespread hunger in secessionist Biafra did a lot to 
rouse the world’s conscience to the humanitarian crisis facing Biafran peoples. 
The international media played a signifi cant role in exposing the humanitarian 
tragedies, especially in the Igbo-speaking parts of Biafra. And many years after the 
war, scholarly accounts of the war, mostly by scholars from the Igbo-speaking parts 
of Baifra, have privileged insights into some of the most hideous acts unleashed 
on Biafrans during the war. Yet, not much has been reported about the atrocities 
perpetrated against the minorities in Biafra, both by the Nigerian military forces 
and the Biafran militias.  This is a gap in Biafra’s history. 
Newsweek, in one of its reports titled “The Resurrection of Biafra,” stated that 
“some of the worst massacres of the war, in fact, occurred when federal troops 
captured minority regions -whereupon the minority tribesmen turned on the Ibos 
in bloody fury.”6 This quote presents the Igbo as the victims in the hands of the 
minority groups, without reference to any experience the minorities might have 
3  National Archives Enugu (NAE) MSP/6 Catholic Relief Services, Special Issue: Nigeria/
Biafra Relief, Summer Edition, 1968.
4  NAE, MSP/6 Catholic Relief Services, Special Issue: Nigeria/Biafra Relief, Summer Edition, 
1968.
5  The Nordic countries comprise of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden and 
their associated territories, the Faroe Islands, Greenland, Svalbard, and Åland Islands.
6  “The Resurrection of Biafra,” Newsweek, March 24, 1969. Ibo refers to the same group as 
Igbo. Ibo was commonly used in colonial writings. 
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had in the Igbo-dominated region before the arrival of the federal troops.  Another 
report claimed that “in some areas outside the East which were temporarily held 
by Biafran forces, as in Benin and the Mid-Western Region, Ibos were killed by 
the local people with at least the acquiescence of the federal force: about 1,000 Ibo 
civilians perished at Benin in this way.”7  Nigerian troops were said to have hunted 
and killed Igbo males above the age of fi ve, leaving the impression that the war was 
waged in a genocidal spirit.8 Colin Legum, a Commonwealth correspondent for 
The Observer, London, also noted that “the worst killing occurring among the Ibos 
has come from the struggle itself that inevitably produced conditions of famine.”9 
Peter Enahoro, who seemed to have sympathised with Biafra wrote: “The Ibos are 
bearing the burden that rightly belongs to all who sought progress for Nigeria.”10 
Gordon Wainman, a volunteer for the Canadian University Service Overseas at 
Kurra Falls in Nigeria, reported the massacre of 30,000 Igbos in Northern Nigeria.11 
Wainman said that many of those who were killed were either buried in mass 
graves or left to rot in the fi elds with a thin layer of dirt thrown over them to 
reduce the stench of the decaying fl esh. 
While not denying the gruesome atrocities committ ed against the Igbo during 
the Biafra War, there is an error in the representation of the victims of the massacres. 
For instance, some of the victims of the 1966 massacre in Northern Nigeria were 
members of minority groups but were generally grouped with Igbos. The report 
of the G. C. M. Onyiuke-led tribunal clearly shows that many people belonging to 
ethnic minority groups in Eastern and Mid-Western Nigeria were victims of the 
May 1966 att ack perpetrated by Northerners.12 Members of the minority groups 
were easily mistaken for Igbos because it was diffi  cult to diff erentiate between the 
two by mere physical appearance. There were no facial marks as could be found 
among the Hausa and the Yoruba, and the patt ern of dressing, mostly western, 
was similar.  N. U. Akpan, Secretary of Government, Republic of Biafra, noted:
The killings in North in 1966, particularly those which occurred from 
7  Conor Cruise O’Brien, “A Condemned People,” The New York Review ix, no. 11, December 
21, 1967.
8  Ibid.  
9  Colin Legum, “Nigeria vs. Biafra: On Taking Sides,” Christianity and Crisis: A Christian 
Journal of Opinion, xxix, no. 9 (March 26, 1969): 151.
10  Peter Enahoro, “A Night of Deep Waters” Nigeria/Biafra, April 1969. Peter Enahoro was 
the brother of late Anthony Enahoro, former Federal Commissioner for Information and 
Labour under General Gowon. Peter’s support or sympathy appears to have been with 
Biafra.
11  Gordon Wainman, “I had a Ringside Seat at a Nigerian Massacre,” Toronto Daily Star, 
December 14, 1968.
12  Report of the Atrocities Tribunal: Appendix B: Eyewitness Accounts of the 1966 Pogrom, 
December 1966.
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the end of September, were indiscriminately directed against people 
from Eastern Nigeria, known in the North by the generic name of 
Yameri...The subsequent att empts in the North to distinguish between 
the Ibos and other peoples of Eastern Nigeria came too late to make 
any impression on the non-Ibo members of Eastern Nigeria, who now 
shared the same fears and dread of the North as the Ibos.13 
The indiscriminate killing of members of Eastern Nigeria accounted for the divided 
loyalty of the minority leaders. While some supported the Biafran secession, others 
felt it was bett er to remain as Nigerians. 
The Politics of Ethnic Minorities in Nigeria
Nigeria, like most African countries, is a multiethnic society with many ethnic 
minorities. The ethnic minority groups in Biafra include, but are not limited to 
Efi k, Ibibio, and Ijaw, and are located along the Eastern border and the oil rich 
southern coast. They are found in the present-day Cross River, Akwa-Ibom, 
Rivers, and Bayelsa States, forming a larger part of the area now known as the 
Niger-Delta region. In 1966, they constituted about 40 percent of the population of 
Biafra, formerly Eastern Nigeria, while the Igbo made up the remaining 60 percent. 
Although these designated minority groups belonged to the Igbo-dominated 
Biafra, they still maintained their distinct ethnic identities throughout the war. All 
the minority ethnic groups had their separate historical origin, distinct language, 
and cultural practices.  
Part of the overarching argument about the war is that it was a war of two 
majority ethnic groups - the Hausa-Fulani and the Igbo.14 This interpretation is 
simplistic and available evidence suggests otherwise. It was rather a war between 
the minorities and the majorities in Nigeria. The fi rst and second military coups 
on January 15 and July 29, 1966 respectively, ushered in a historic moment in the 
history of the minorities in Nigeria. The Richard’s Constitution of 1947 created 
a faulty regional structure that encouraged regionalism in Nigeria’s post-
independence politics. Apart from the fact that one of the regions was large enough 
to dominate the other two regions, the political parties in the federation were 
regionally oriented with politicians like Nnamdi Azikiwe, Obafemi Awolowo, 
and Ahmadu Bello, depending on ethnic and regional support to achieve national 
power. For instance, the NCNC led by Nnamdi Azikiwe, an Igbo, was seen as 
an Igbo party while the NPC led by Ahmadu Bello, a Hausa, was considered a 
Hausa-Fulani party. The Action Group was called a Yoruba party because its 
leader, Obafemi Awolowo, was Yoruba. Within the existing regional structure, 
13  Ntieyong U. Akpan, The Struggle for Secession, 1866-1970 (London: Frank Cass, 1972), 152. 
14  Conor Cruise O’Brien, “A Condemned People.” 
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minority aspirations were sometimes ignored but could easily be used to promote 
party propaganda.15 Leaders of the minority ethnic groups found themselves in 
a disadvantaged position in the entire federal political equation. It was against 
this background that minority leaders in diff erent regions formed movements 
that started agitating for the creation of more states where their interests could 
be adequately protected. Some of the major movements that were formed before 
independence included the Calabar-Ogoja-River (COR) State Movement in the 
Eastern Region, the Mid-West State Movement in the Western Region, and the 
Middle-Belt State Movement in the Northern Region. These movements were 
neither cultural nor national groups but were “situationally” or circumstantially 
formed to agitate for minority rights in the larger state. Though not homogenous, 
the ethnic minorities were able to form formal structures that represented their 
groups, a development that challenges constructivist arguments that the “lack of 
pure identities means that groups are not homogenous and cannot be represented 
through formal structures.”16 
The leaders of these state creation movements believed that the formation 
of more states would eliminate their fears of domination by the majority ethnic 
groups. This concern led to the sett ing up of the Minorities Commission by the 
colonial authorities in 1957.17  It was evident that state creation would allay the 
fears of the minorities and guarantee more stability in the federation, but the 
Commission pointed out that if new states were created, they would be given 
two years to sett le down before independence could be granted to the country.18 
As events later revealed, the euphoria of gaining the long awaited independence 
blinded the national leaders to other realities. As the domination of the minorities 
continued, riots from minority areas like Tiv lingered. The Tiv under the leadership 
of Joseph Tarka had agitated for the creation of the Middle-Belt State. The Mid-
West minorities in the former Western Region formed their own state as a result 
of the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) and National Council of Nigeria and 
Cameroon (NCNC) plot against the Action Group (AG – a Yoruba-led party). The 
Mid-West creation was a way of weakening the infl uence of the Action Congress 
in the Western Region.
The growing agitations of groups dedicated to improving the fortunes of 
minorities in Nigeria received a remarkable boost by Nigeria’s fi rst and second 
15  NAE (Unclassifi ed document), “Understanding the Nigerian Crisis,” Benin: Department 
of International Aff airs and Information, Benin, 1968, 5.
16  Stephen May et al., Ethnicity, Nationalism and Minority Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 8-9.
17  Michael Crowder, The Story of Nigeria (London: Faber and Faber, 1978), 242.
18  Nigeria Ministry of Information, The Struggle for One Nigeria (Lagos: Ministry of 
Information, 1967), 3.
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coups of the late 1960s. While the fi rst coup dismantled the infl uence of the 
Hausa-Fulani potentates, the second coup dislodged the Igbo from their positions 
of military control. These developments altered the balance of power and ethnic 
minorities in the army and civil service became central players in Nigerian politics. 
General Yakubu Gowon, who is Ngas, a minority ethnic group in the Northern 
Region, had Colonel Akahan, a Tiv, as his Chief of Staff . Some commentators 
interpreted the new leadership structure as the government of Middle-Belt 
minorities that emerged to dominate politics of Northern Nigeria.19 When Lt. 
Colonel Joseph Akahan died in a plane crash, some leaders of the Middle-Belt 
region accused Northern leaders of masterminding his death.20 Although there 
was no evidence linking Akahan’s death to Northern leaders, the ensuing 
controversy led to the withdrawal of Tivs from diff erent parts of the North to 
Tiv land.  At the centre of the civil service were minority group members such as 
Allison Ayida, Philip Asiodu, and A. A. Att a, who were regarded as the “super-
permanent secretaries” because of their infl uence. People also regarded these 
“super-permanent Secretaries” as members of the “Oxford tribe” because they had 
received their degrees from Oxford University.21 Ayida and Asiodu, particularly, 
belonged to Gowon’s three-member kitchen cabinet.22 Edwin Ogbu, who was a 
Permanent Secretary in charge of External Aff airs, was equally a minority from the 
Middle-Belt. Apart from Obafemi Awolowo, a Yoruba, some of the commissioners 
who largely championed the war politics were of minority ethnic origin.  Anthony 
Enahoro, Commissioner, Ministry of Information and Okoi Arikpo Commissioner, 
Ministry of External Aff airs were minority members. There were obviously other 
members of Gowon’s cabinet from the majority ethnic groups but those of the 
minority ethnic groups appeared to have wielded more infl uence. The Nigeria-
Biafra War era was perhaps the fi rst time members of the minority groups could 
occupy many important positions in the military, politics, and civil service. The 
assistance provided to Gowon by the increased number of minorities in the civil 
service and army was critical in the administration’s successful prosecution of the 
Nigerian civil war.  
The minorities’ ascendancy after the July 1966 coup created an opportunity 
for them to address the grievances which they had long expressed through their 
movements. The project of state creation came at a time when the country was in a 
political stalemate. The coups and countercoups, the massacres of Igbos in diff erent 
19  Department of State, Telegram, The Death of Akahan, August 1967.
20  Ibid. 
21  John J. Stremlau, The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War 1967-1970 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1977), 26.
22  Ibid., 150.
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parts of Nigeria, the failure to implement the Aburi Accord by the Nigerian 
government, the declaration of the Republic of Biafra, and the creation of twelve 
states by General Gowon worsened the tension between Nigeria and Biafra.  It was 
a clash of rights, and both General Ojukwu and General Gowon seemed to have 
legitimate claims. Biafrans claimed the right to survival while Nigerians claimed 
the right to the corporate existence of the country. Two new states were carved out 
of the former Eastern Region, leaving it with a total of three states. This seemed to 
be a trump card for the federal government to court the minorities and forestall 
the Eastern secession. That was obviously the immediate objective but the long 
term goal of the minority leaders in state creation was to liberate the minorities 
from majority dominance. While the argument in favour of state creation was 
ostensibly to ensure stability and national unity, it was no less a struggle of the 
minorities against the old dominant majorities in the various regions. Within the 
Hausa-Fulani leadership, state creation was considered a dangerous development, 
but to the new states like Kwara and Benue-Plateau, it was an opportunity to get 
liberated from the Hausa-Fulani hegemony.23 For some of the ethnic minorities in 
the former Eastern Region, state creation meant liberation from the alleged Igbo 
domination. 
Ethnic Minorities as Victims in Biafra
Violent confl icts such as the Nigeria-Biafra War infl ict serious injuries and create 
victims of all kinds. To the outside world, the known victims of the war were the Igbo 
who, apart from being targets of the 1966 massacres, also suff ered indiscriminate 
bombings and monumental starvation that allegedly took about two million lives. 
Within the forty-two years since the war ended, more revelations about the war 
atrocities on the minorities have emerged. Surviving records and oral histories of 
the war suggest that minorities in Biafra became individual and collective victims 
of the war. These accounts also reveal how individuals and groups committ ed 
heinous atrocities under the pretext of either fi ghting a war of survival for Biafra 
or a war of national unity for Nigeria. 
One recurrent question that comes up about the Biafran minorities is: what 
was the att itude of the minorities to the Biafran secession? This cannot be answered 
with certainty. While Biafra claimed that the minorities were wholeheartedly in 
support of the secession, the federal government maintained that the minorities 
had been longing to be liberated.24 Suzanne Cronje, one of the most prolifi c 
journalists on the Biafra war, observed that “the feelings of the minorities were 
23  National Archives United Kingdom (NAUK), FCO 38/222, Political Aff airs, (Internal) 
Demonstration.
24  O’Brien, “A Condemned People.”  
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diffi  cult to defi ne.”25 In the fi rst place, the anti-Igbo uprising which would have 
come from the minorities as people that needed liberation did not emerge, nor 
was there any noticeable form of unrest among the minorities under the Biafran 
administration. Loyalties were, in fact, divided. The supporters of the Biafran 
secession were those who felt that the Easterners as a group had shared the same 
fate as victims of the 1966 massacres and expulsion from the North, while those 
who joined the Nigerian government saw it as an opportunity to have a separate 
state of their own and be free from any domination. Although the ethnic minorities 
had clamoured for a separate state of their own, it was very diffi  cult to determine 
what they actually wanted during the war. A plebiscite could have given them an 
opportunity to express themselves but the proposal was strongly rejected by the 
federal government who felt it would imply a withdrawal of the federal troops to 
the prewar boundaries.26   
To understand the divergent att itudes of the minorities to the Biafran 
secession, an examination of oral histories from people who occupied positions of 
authority during the war as well as from ordinary people is necessary. The Ikun in 
the present day Cross River State presents a good example of the crimes committ ed 
against the minorities. The Ikun clan is in the Biase Local Government Area of 
Cross River State. The people share a common boundary with the Ohafi a, an Igbo 
clan, in the present day Abia State. When the war broke out, Biafra stationed some 
of its troops in the Cross River region, including Ikun. According to a female 
survivor-victim of the Biafran occupation, the Ikun initially supported Biafra and 
had friendly relations with the soldiers, who were also accommodating. As time 
went on, tensions emerged. Some Ikun men were suspected of collaborating with 
Nigerian soldiers. This led to arrests, looting, rapes, and other atrocities in Ikun 
land.27 William Norris of the London Times who visited Biafra, also reported an eye-
witness account in which some men of Ibibio ethnic origin were beaten to death at 
Umuahia on April 2, 1968.28  These Ibibios who included old men and young men 
were apparently suspected of collaborating with advancing Nigerian troops. They 
were reportedly frog-marched across an open space while the local people att acked 
them with sticks and clubs.29 Oral testimony by the survivor-victim corroborates 
25  Suzanne Cronje, “Two Levels of Truth,” Nigeria/Biafra, April 1969. 
26  U.S. National Archives, Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-5, Part 1, Documents on Sub-Saharan Africa, 1969-1972, 
Document 35.
27  Anonymous, Oral Interview by Atu Charles at Amanki Village in Ikun Clan of Biase Local 
Government Area, April 14, 1994. Transcript in my custody. The informant is described as 
victim-survivor because, she lost her four day old baby and grandmother. 
28  Department of State, Telegram, Nigerian Rebel Atrocities, May 1968.
29  Ibid. 
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this account. According to the eyewitness, Biafran soldiers allegedly took Ikun 
men to Ohafi a for a meeting but never brought them back. The informant also 
alleged that the soldiers returned to the community and rounded up some men 
within their reach and shot them. This survivor who lost her four-day old son and 
her grandmother seemed to have suspected foul play from the Ohafi a people who 
share a common boundary with her community.  The victimization continued 
until the Biafran headquarters likely issued an order that people should not be 
killed again.30 By this time, the remaining people had escaped the community, 
leaving behind only the soldiers, the Ohafi a, and some Ikun who were said to be 
of mixed blood - half Ohafi a and half Ikun. These remaining groups, according to 
the survivor-victim shared the fi sh ponds, forests, and farms belonging to Ikun 
people. 31 
In a related account, B. J. Ikpeme, a member of a minority group and retired 
Senior Medical Offi  cer in the then Eastern Region revealed atrocities perpetrated 
by Biafran soldiers against the minorities in some towns in the present-day Cross 
River and Akwa- Ibom States. Ikpeme argued that Ojukwu’s declaration of the 
Republic of Biafra had been issued against the wishes of the majority of the people 
of Calabar, Ogoja, and Rivers Provinces, who for many years had agitated for a 
separate state of their own. According to Ikpeme, the Igbo leadership, who did 
not like the minority agitation, decided either to force the fi ve million non-Igbo 
minorities into the new republic or eliminate them. It was on this basis, claims 
Ikpeme, that Biafran soldiers were quickly sent to the minority areas to “keep down 
the people, detain or even kill all who dared raise a voice in protest against the 
idea of Biafra.”32 It was during this period that the non-Igbos started experiencing 
diff erent forms of inhumane treatment, ranging from torture, detention, to killing. 
Ikpeme himself was detained in what he described as a “concentration camp” and 
was later transferred to a prison cell where he was given urine to drink when he 
demanded water.33 
Ikpeme described instances where the Biafran soldiers allegedly perpetrated 
atrocities against some members of non-Igbo groups. In Asang town in Enyong, 
from where Ikpeme originated, about four hundred people were carried away 
to an unknown destination. Another town called Att an Onoyon in the same 
30  Anonymous, Oral Interview by Atu Charles.
31  Ibid.  
32  Presbyterian Church of Canada Archives (hereafter PCCA), “The Secessionist Regime 
and the Non-Ibo ‘Minorities’ in the East of Nigeria.” This was a text of statements at the 
Peace Talks on the Nigerian Civil War, at Kampala, Uganda. Ikpeme who was a retired 
senior medical offi  cer in the former Eastern Region also served as a member of the Federal 
Government delegation at the Kampala Peace Talks. 
33  Ibid. 
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Enyong was burnt down with many people killed by the Biafran soldiers. In Ikot 
Ekpenyong in the present day Akwa Ibom State, Biafran soldiers were said to 
have shot many villagers. Ikpeme also recounted that similar killings carried out 
by Biafran soldiers took place in places like Ikot Okpot and Idoro. He equally 
alleged that when the Nigerian troops landed in Calabar on October 18, 1967, 
about 169 civilians in detention were lined up and shot by Biafran soldiers. This 
same allegation had also been published in The New York Times as an informational 
advertisement by the Consulate General of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in New 
York.34 These two accounts, given by the survivor-victim of Ikun and Dr. Ikpeme, 
portray similar pictures of gross atrocities but with diff erent underlying objectives. 
Biafra ran a special operations group known as the Biafran Organization 
of Freedom Fighter (BOFF). This was a paramilitary organization set up by the 
civil defence group in Bende.35 This special operations group was instructed to 
suppress the enemy, but they apparently targeted some minorities in Cross River 
and Akwa Ibom States on the account of sabotage against the Biafran government.36 
Philip Effi  ong, who was from one of the ethnic minorities, probably ordered 
the BOFF’s “combing” operations after the death of one Major Achibong. In an 
interview, the informant did not reveal the circumstances surrounding the death 
of Major Achibong who was equally a member of a minority group. He argued 
that if Effi  ong ordered any “combing” operation, it could not have been aimed 
at exterminating members of his ethnic group. What the informant’s testimony 
reveals is that some members of the BOFF who also operated as the Bende Special 
Operations group could have taken advantage of the assignment to accomplish 
selfi sh interests.  For instance, an intriguing revelation about the Bende Special 
Operations group shows that some of its members decapitated their victims for 
ritual purposes.37 Head-hunting in warfare was a cultural practice in some parts 
of Biafra known as Old Bende. This tradition survived up to the beginning of the 
twentieth century. In the pre-colonial era, it was culturally acceptable for members 
of a certain age-grade to go to war and come back with human heads as trophies. 
Successful warriors who brought back trophies were highly honoured among 
members of their age-grades and in the whole community. The war situation 
might have created an opportunity for the warrior group to reactivate a tradition 
that had faded out as a result of Western infl uence. 
Although all the minority groups suff ered diff erent forms atrocity, the 
34  “The Nigerian Civil War: the Way Out,” The New York Times, July 8, 1968.
35  Bende area covers some local governments in the present-day Abia State.
36  S. B. A. Atuloma, Oral Interview by Sydney Emezue at Umuahia, September 18, 1990. 
Transcript in my custody.
37  Ibid.
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minorities in the Rivers area seemed to be worse off . Apart from torture and other 
forms of human rights abuse, they were also evicted from their homes. For instance, 
when two strategic villages on the New Calabar and Sombriero Rivers fell to the 
federal troops in February 1968, the news that followed was that the majority 
of the soldiers that led the operation were Rivers young men, predominantly 
Kalabari.  As a consequence, many people from Bakana, one of the major Kalabari 
towns, were removed and sent to Igbo towns like Umuahia, Owerri, Abiriba, and 
Ozuitem, most likely to avoid further infi ltration of the enemies.38 Chief Samuel 
Mbakwe, who served as Biafran Provincial Administrator for Okigwe Province, 
noted the infl ux of refugees from Port Harcourt but did not explain whether or 
not they were forcibly removed by the Biafran forces.39 We do know that Biafrans 
tended to regard anyone who stayed at his post and was overrun by the federal 
advance as a collaborator. An Irish priest who served in Rivers State reported 
that the Igbo soldiers were suspicious of some Rivers people who sometimes led 
federal troops through their lines along hidden creeks.40 This att itude, according 
to the priest, created a mixture of panic, fear, and hatred among the Biafran troops 
towards some indigenous people of Rivers State. People who were maltreated 
were said to have been involved in this act of “sabotage” against Biafra. 
At Bolo and Ogu in Okirika, and Onne in Eleme, the villagers suff ered the 
same fate. After the batt le at Onne, Biafran troops removed the town inhabitants 
suspected to have collaborated with federal troops and sent them to the Rainbow 
Town headquarters of the Biafran 52 Brigade in Port Harcourt. Graham-Douglas, 
who was also thrown into detention, claimed to have seen about three hundred 
men detained in the Rainbow Town. He asserted that no fewer than six thousand 
Rivers people were sent to diff erent refugee camps in Igboland.41 
It is important to point out that propaganda played a prominent role in the 
Nigeria-Biafra war. Some of the pamphlets published by Nigeria and Biafra or their 
agents were loaded with misinformation. Commenting on a section of Graham-
Douglas’ pamphlet titled, Ojukwu’s Rebellion and World Opinion, John Tilney of 
Liverpool observed, “That may be propaganda. What Graham-Douglas says may 
not be wholly true. But we are all plagued by propaganda by both sides.” 42 Both 
Biafra and Nigeria professionally engaged propaganda as a potent tool in the war. 
While Biafra hired Markpress, Nigeria engaged the services of Galatz ine Chant 
38  Nabo B. Graham-Douglas, Ojukwu’s Rebellion and World Opinion (Lagos: Nigerian National 
Press, 1968). 
39  Samuel Onunaka Mbakwe, Oral Interview by Sydney Emezue at Avutu/Etiti, September 
18, 1990. Transcript in my custody.
40  Donald Musgrave, “Priest Tells of War Atrocities,” The Irish Times, May 23, 1968.
41  Graham-Douglas, Ojukwu’s Rebellion, 17.
42  House of Commons Report on the Nigerian Situation, London, August 27, 1968.
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Russell and Partners for the public relations job.43  Graham-Douglas’ story that the 
minorities in Biafra had suff ered more hardships and molestations than the Igbo 
could claim to have suff ered at the hands of Northern Nigerians was apparently 
part of Nigeria’s propaganda which he also presented in London in August 1968.44 
Graham-Douglas’ comments about Biafra had been criticised by an offi  cial of the 
British High Commission for lack of inside information about Biafra.45 He was 
equally described as talking “out of the back of his head” because of unverifi able 
comments he made about the Catholic Church.46   
J. O. J. Okezie observed that Graham-Douglas’ switch to the Nigerian side 
might have led to the Igbo att itude of distrust towards the minorities. He pointed 
out however, that the sabotage accusation was not limited to the non-Igbo. The 
Onitsha people who were indisputably Igbo also suff ered the same intimidation 
and humiliation. Many of their prominent leaders were said to have been detained 
by the Ojukwu-led government for allegedly contributing to the fall of Onitsha 
and Enugu.47 A brigadier in the Biafran Army narrated his personal experience in 
the sabotage accusation. The offi  cer stated that two members of a local militia had 
writt en an anonymous petition against him. When the writers were discovered, 
they confessed that they had undertaken to cut down his popularity. The two 
offi  cers were brought before Ojukwu by Major General Effi  ong who ordered their 
execution. The offi  cer in his magnanimity refused to execute the petition writers.48 
This illustrates how the sabotage syndrome assumed a life of its own and became 
an instrument of victimization against innocent persons. There is no doubt that 
many people lost their lives without substantial evidence, as is common during 
times of war whether in Africa or elsewhere.  
Violence towards the minorities was not perpetrated only by the Biafran 
troops. The federal troops were equally culpable of this crime. In Andoni area of 
Rivers for example, an appeal was sent to the Biafran Head of State narrating how 
the villages were att acked on Sunday, March 31, 1968 as a result of their loyalty to 
Biafra. The report alleged that the att ack was led by fi ve collaborators who were 
likely members of the minority group. One of the victims of the att ack was said 
to be an undergraduate student of the University of Ibadan who was a member 
of the Biafran Provincial Enlightenment Committ ee. Apart from burning down 
43  NAUK, FCO 65/ 445/1, Nigeria Press: Biafran Propaganda.
44  “Graham –Douglas Speaks,” West Africa, August 17, 1968.
45  NAUK FCO 23/182, Nigeria and Biafra, 1968.
46  Ibid. 
47  J. O. J. Okezie, Oral Interview by Sydney Emezue at Umuahia, September 17, 1990. 
Transcript in my custody.He was a medical doctor and fi rst republic politician. 
48  P. C. Amadi, Oral Interview by Sydney Emezue at Owerri, September 19, 1990. Transcript 
in my custody. Amadi was a brigadier in the Biafran Army. 
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houses and property, the petitioners also alleged that over 500 persons including 
children were killed. 49 Similarly, approximately 2,000 Efi ks were reportedly killed 
in Calabar by the federal troops.  The victims were said to be returnees who 
revolted against the federal occupation. The killing was reported to Gowon who 
subsequently appointed Dr. J. B. Ikpeme as Chief Justice when the killing had 
nearly been completed.50  
The Nigerian Air Force left their own mark in the minorities’ areas. They were 
accused of indiscriminate bombing of civilian occupied areas. William Norris of 
the London Sunday Times in an article titled, “Nightmare in Biafra,” reported how 
the high-fl ying Russian Ilyushin jets dropped bombs in civilian centres in Biafra. 
He stated that, 
Slowly, but eff ectively, a reign of terror has been created. The ruins of 
Mary Slessor Memorial Hospital at Itu, of the hospital of Itigidi, and of 
the Cheshire Home at Port Harcourt, stand as a kind of grisly memorial 
to something that must be if words are to retain any meaning. It is 
certainly not war.51 
These targets were all in the minority areas. Cronje similarly reported that the 
Nigerian Air Force had bombed the minorities as much, if not more than the 
Igbos.52
The plight of the minorities had been so alarming that several Nigerian 
students of Rivers State origin in London staged a peaceful protest against the 
killing and displacement of their people. In addition to a peaceful march from 
Trafalgar Square to the House of Commons in London, they also sent out petitions 
to the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), His Holiness 
Pope Paul VI, Emperor Haile Selaisie, the British Prime Minister and other relevant 
groups, asking them to bring pressure on the warring parties to stop the senseless 
killing of innocent and defenceless people of Rivers State.53 The petition may not 
have produced any direct result but must have contributed to the pressure on the 
warring parties to negotiate for peace. 
The war had been fought not just for political reasons but also for economic 
motives with oil resources in mind.  And for a national economy that had begun 
to depend on oil, control of the oil-bearing region that was inhabited by the ethnic 
minorities became crucial to winning the war. Recent discoveries by the Ministry 
49  Eastern Nigeria, Ministry of Information, The Case for Biafra, fi rst independence anniversary 
edition (Enugu: Ministry of Information, Republic of Biafra, June 12, 1968), 28-29.
50  Ibid., 27-28.
51  Quoted in Eastern Nigeria, Ministry of Information, 23.
52  Suzanne Cronje, “Two Levels of Truth” Nigeria/Biafra, April 1969.
53  NAUK, FCO 38/222, Demonstration. 
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of Defence-sponsored humanitarian demining project butt ress the claim that the 
oil rich minority areas were hotly contested in the war. Although the war had 
ended, people in diff erent parts of the then Biafra continued to die from accidental 
explosion of unexploded mines. According to Emeka Uhuegbu, the fi eld 
administrator of the United Nations mandated demining project, the minority 
areas of Rivers State had the highest number of landmine victims. Akwa Ibom and 
Imo States follow on the list.54  The demining team discovered 400 unexploded 
bombs in a forest in Rivers State. These bombs and landmines had killed several 
unsuspecting villagers who went to farm, resulting in the nickname, “evil forest.”55 
Conclusion
Brutal confl icts such as the Nigeria-Biafra War infl ict painful injuries on all people. 
The few cases examined in this article show that the ethnic minorities were also 
individually and collectively victimized. Gowon’s creation of new states and 
Ojukwu’s declaration of the Republic of Biafra created a sharp division among 
ethnic minorities. This meant loyalties and disloyalties to the two warring parties. 
Upholding Nigeria’s principle of twelve-state structure meant sabotage to Biafra, 
while supporting Biafra’s secession implied rebellion to the Nigerian government. 
The minorities in the oil-rich region seemed to have been worse off  in the war. The 
warring parties wanted to control the region and its oil resource. It was largely for 
this reason that the region assumed strategic importance and became a theatre of 
war.  
General Gowon’s declaration of “No Victor, No Vanquished” after Biafra’s 
capitulation was a good social therapy that helped calm the war tensions among 
the groups that were involved in the confl ict. Nevertheless, the vestiges of the 
war are still present in the minority areas. The unexploded bombs in these highly 
contested areas still pose a huge threat.  People continue to lose their legs and lives 
following accidental explosions. The victims of these accidental explosions are yet 
to be given adequate rehabilitation.56 
Despite the suff erings of the ethnic minorities during and in the aftermath of 
the war, their perspective in the civil war discourses remains almost forgott en. Their 
victimhood, like that of the Igbo, should be accorded a place in the historiography 
of the Nigeria-Biafra War. The struggle for Nigeria’s unity wouldn’t have been 
possible without the minorities. The struggle over control of the oil-rich region 
placed them in a disadvantaged position by exposing them to more dangers and 
54  Emeka Uhegbu, interview by author, July 14, 2011. Field Administrator, Ministry of 
Defence-sponsored Humanitarian Demining Project. The project was mandated by the 
United Nations Organization under the Ott awa Convention of 2001. 
55  Uhegbu, interview by author. 
56  Ibid. 
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destruction. Recognizing the ethnic minorities as victims would place them in 
their rightful position in the nation’s history.   
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